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Abstract  
In the twenty years since the post-Cold War wave of democratisation spread across 
Africa, experiments in participatory governance have revealed fundamental 
contradictions between their normative bases and their practical application on the 
ground.  Responding to calls for a greater focus on ‘the politics of everyday life’ 
including the actions of local actors in the context of less-westernised aspects of 
indigenous political culture, and drawing on the experiences and actions, over a six 
year period, of the principal civic network involved initially in Malawi’s PRS process, 
this paper illustrates how contemporary Malawian politics at local level comprises a 
complex mix of the old and the new.  Charting the evolving agency and activities of 
network members at district level, the paper demonstrates how, in the ongoing 
struggles for resources for everyday life,  normative discourses of participation and 
representation are combined with more traditional cultures and practices in shaping, 
moulding and ultimately, it is proposed, invigorating contemporary political agency in 
Malawi.   
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Introduction 
It is now over twenty years since a wave of democratisation swept across Africa 
heralding, in the words of Thabo Mbeki, an ‘African renaissance’1.  This renaissance 
was perhaps more Western than African however, with high levels of donor support 
targeted at facilitating the smooth and swift importation of Western liberal democratic 
institutions and norms to African contexts.  While, following Western liberal tradition 
with its emphasis on electoral representation, democratisation was initially largely 
synonymous with multiparty elections (the number of multiparty African states grew 
from 9 in 1988 to 45 in 1999)2, subsequent donor support for citizen participation 
across a range of initiatives – from district-level project planning committees to 
national level Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) processes – revealed the 
democratisation project to be broader and deeper than simply electoral reform and 
multipartyism alone.  The era of participatory governance had arrived. 
 
Aimed at opening up political spaces and affording a voice to citizens in development 
policy and practice, participation in its many guises – from Participatory Rural 
Appraisals (PRAs) to Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs) to PRS processes – 
is now virtually ubiquitous across Africa.  While Western donors, NGOs and policy 
makers continue to extol its virtues, the concept and exercise of participation within 
contemporary governance has also drawn sharp critique from a range of 
commentators.  While their concerns and areas of focus of certainly vary, a core 
                                                 
1 For more background on this see E.K. Bongmba, ‘Reflections on Thabo Mbeki’s African 
Renaissance’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 30, 2 (2004), pp. 291-316. 
2 M. Bratton and N. van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in a 
Comparative Perspective (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.6. 
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concern across this literature remains the politics of who gets to participate and to 
what end.  In relation to the ‘who’ within PRS processes in particular and how this 
relates to the ‘to what end’, it has been variously argued that the involvement of a 
narrow grouping of elite NGOs results in a reinforcement of existing inequalities3, 
lending legitimacy and support to the hegemonic development project which, while 
ostensibly engaging the poor through their NGO representatives, results paradoxically 
in their further marginalisation4.  Some commentators, highlighting the inevitable 
contests between global and local imperatives, have called for a greater focus on ‘the 
politics of the local’ including the actions of local actors in the context of less-
westernised aspects of indigenous culture 5, drawing attention to the importance of 
local contestation and resistance and exploring how local inequalities and power 
relations are harnessed in consolidating inequitable developmental outcomes6.  This 
inherent contradiction between the normative, idealised theories of participatory 
governance and its practice on the ground has recently been discussed in some detail 
in a thought-provoking paper by Robins et al who highlight the disconnect between 
                                                 
3See for example A. Cornwall and K. Brock, ‘What do Buzzwords do for Development Policy? A 
Critical look at “participation”, “empowerment” and “poverty reduction”’, Third World Quarterly, 26, 
7 (2005), pp. 1043-60; J. Gould, The New Conditionality: The Politics of Poverty Reduction Strategies 
(London and New York: Zed Books, 2005), p. 142; A. Fraser, ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: 
Now Who Calls the Shots?’, Review of African Political Economy, 32, 104 (2005), pp. 317-40; H. 
Weber, ‘A Political Analysis of the PRSP Initiative: Social Struggles and the Organisation of Persistent 
Relations of Inequality’ Globalizations, 3, 2 (2006), pp. 187-206. 
4 D. Craig and D. Porter, ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: A New Convergence’, World 
Development, 31, 1 (2002), pp 53-69; Weber, ‘A Political Analysis of the PRSP Initiative: Social 
Struggles and the Organisation of Persistent Relations of Inequality’; T. Zack-Williams and G. Mohan, 
‘Africa from SAPs to PRSP: Plus ca change plus c’est la meme chose’, Review of African Political 
Economy, 32, 106 (2006), pp. 501-3.   
5 G. Mohan and K. Stokke, ‘Participatory development and Empowerment: The Dangers of Localism’, 
Third World Quarterly, 21, 2 (2004), pp. 247-68.  J. Lwanda, ‘Kwacha: The Violence of Money in 
Malawi’s Politics, 1954-2004’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 32, 3 (2006), pp. 525-44. 
6 While, for some, the ‘tyranny of participation’ (B. Cooke and U. Kothari, Participation: The New 
Tyranny?, London and New York, Zed Books, 2001) leaves little scope for local resistance, others 
draw attention to the inevitable contests for primacy between local and global imperatives and 
knowledge (see for example, Craig and Porter, ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: A New 
Convergence’ , Weber, 2006, ‘A Political Analysis of the PRSP Initiative’, and J. Lazarus, 
‘Participation in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: reviewing the past, assessing the present and 
predicting the future, Third World Quarterly, 29, 6 (2008), pp. 1205-21). 
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the Western model of citizenship and the varying political cultures and practices in the 
places into which it has been imported.  As the authors note, ‘there is a glaring 
disjuncture between everyday political practices and the models of democracy, 
citizenship and participation that are exported throughout the world’7.  All of these 
contributions raise important questions in relation to the ‘how’ of participatory 
governance – most notably, who participates?, how do they do so?, and how do the 
imported institutions of participatory governance interact with existing political 
cultures, practices and constellations of power?  These questions form the subject of 
this paper which explores the relational implications of contemporary participatory 
governance arrangements in Malawi.  Drawing on experiences and the fractious 
journey from 2000 to 2006 of the principal civic network involved initially in 
Malawi’s PRS process, the Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN), the paper 
illustrates how contemporary politics comprises a complex mix of the old and the 
new, where, in the ongoing struggles for resources for everyday life,  normative 
discourses of participation and representation are combined with more traditional 
cultures and practices in shaping and moulding contemporary political agency in 
Malawi.  This hybridised political complex – falling between citizenship and 
clientship – highlights the importance of bearing in mind ‘the politics of everyday 
life’8 when both thinking about and setting expectations for contemporary 
governance.   
 
Fieldwork for the study from which this article draws was carried out by the author 
over the summers of 2005 and 2006 in Malawi.  Forty-five semi-structured interviews 
were carried out with people involved, at different stages and at different levels, in 
                                                 
7 S. Robins, A. Cornwall and B. von Lieres, ‘Rethinking “Citizenship” in the Postcolony’, Third World 
Quarterly, 29, 6 (2008), pp. 1069-86.  
8 idem, p. 1085. 
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both the PRS process and its successor, the Malawi Growth and Development 
Strategy (MGDS).  These included representatives from MEJN’s member 
organisations, committee members from 8 of MEJN’s District Chapters9 and 
commentators on the evolving socio-political climate more generally.  An additional 
piece of research (commissioned by MEJN) on the network’s District Chapter 
Program (see below) was carried out in 2005.  This research involved extensive travel 
throughout the country with MEJN staff and meetings with many of the network’s 
local 'members'.  While falling short of a full-scale ethnographic study, the time spent 
with MEJN staff and collaborators facilitated a more in-depth study of the network’s 
culture, practices and ongoing challenges, providing a rich source of material on 
evolving relations within the network and beyond.   
 
The paper is structured as follows.  In the following section I begin the story of the 
arrival of participatory governance in Malawi with the introduction of the PRS 
process.  I show how, at the time, it represented, for many actors involved, a new 
departure in how politics was to be carried out, carrying the potential to open up the 
political space, reorienting power relations.  In the next section I discuss the research 
approach employed which, breaking with more conventional approaches which have 
tended to focus on either the policy formulation phase or policy outcomes of specific 
participatory governance processes10, takes a longer term approach focused on agency 
                                                 
9 Group interviews were held with Chapter committee members in Chitipa, Karonga, Mangochi, 
Mchinji, Mzimba, Nkhatabay, Nsanje and Ntcheu districts. 
10 See for example Craig and Porter, ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: A New Convergence’; R. 
McGee, J. Levene and A. Hughes, ‘Assessing participation in poverty reduction strategy papers: a 
desk-based synthesis of experience in sub-Saharan Africa’, Research Report 52 (Sussex: IDS, 2002); 
D. Booth, ‘Introduction and Overview’, Development Policy Review, 21, 2 (2003), pp. 131-59 (special 
edition on PRSPs); E. Bwalya, L. Rakner, L. Svasand, A. Tostensen and M. Tsoka, ‘Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Processes in Malawi and Zambia’, Report 2004:8, Chr. Michelsen Institute, 
http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/?1829=poverty-reduction-strategy-processes-in-malawi-and-
zambia, 2004, accessed December 15th, 2009; R. Driscoll and A. Evans, ‘Second-Generation Poverty 
Reduction Strategies: New Opportunities and Emerging Issues’, Development Policy Review, 23,1 
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and power dynamics over time.  This focus on the longer term, I argue, allows us to 
see participatory governance not as a unique and discrete set of time-bound projects 
and strategy approaches, but rather as on ongoing dynamic characterised by shifting 
relations and constellations of power.  Given that the norms, strategies and institutions 
of the democratisation project do not arrive into institutional, strategic and cultural 
vacuums, in the next section I attempt to draw a historical and context-specific picture 
of the political and social cultures on which they have been transposed and with 
which they interact in Malawi.  Drawing specifically from Malawian sources, but also 
from broader established writings on the political legacies of colonialism, I highlight 
the fundamental tensions and contradictions between the imported tenets and norms of 
democracy and participation on the one hand, and existing (yet ever changing) 
political cultural legacies on the other.   
 
The final section then turns to the politics of participation both within the institutions 
of participatory governance and without, and traces the heady and fractious journey of 
MEJN as it mediates and negotiates, as both broker and client, the interests and 
requirements of actors at a range of levels within the new ‘democratic’ dispensation.   
MEJN’s ongoing journey, I argue, highlights the ongoing importance and power of a 
hierarchy of ‘big men’ (local, national and international) in Malawian life, with the 
brokering of resources a daily necessity for all.  As becomes apparent, these brokers 
or ‘big men’ need their clients as much as their clients need them however, and the 
particular character of Malawian political culture and practice, a complex mix of old 
and new, is revealed in ‘clients’ appropriation of Western democratic discourses of 
                                                                                                                                            
(2005), pp. 5-26; Gould, The New Conditionality: The Politics of Poverty Reduction Strategies; Zack-
Williams and Mohan, ‘Africa from SAPs to PRSP: Plus ca change plus c’est la meme chose’; J. 
Lazarus, ‘Participation in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: reviewing the past, assessing the present 
and predicting the future’. 
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‘participation’ and ‘representation’ in demanding accountability and action from their 
‘big men’.  In an era of widespread disillusionment with democracy in the West, the 
question is posed as to whether this hybridised political complex represents, in fact, a 
more dynamic and active form of citizenship than its normalised and often idealised 
Western variant.    
 
 
Importing democracy: The arrival of participatory governance to 
Malawi  
 
It was 1994, with the country’s first multiparty elections bringing the 30 years of rule 
under ‘Life President’ Hastings Banda to a close, when democracy set up its stall in 
Malawi.  The broader institutional trappings soon followed with the Local 
Government Act of 1998 providing for the creation of local district assemblies under 
the new policy of decentralisation11, together with the introduction of the PRS 
process, as a condition for HIPC debt relief, in 200012.  Our focus here begins with the 
introduction of the PRS process (though, as we will see, it later interacts with the 
decentralisation process) as, with international attention focused on it, this potentially 
represented a significant new departure in governance practice and relations.    
 
With the advent of the PRS process, development policy was no longer to be dictated 
from the plush interiors of the World Bank’s headquarters in Washington.  In contrast, 
PRS strategies were to be country-driven and participatory, with all relevant 
                                                 
11 H. Meinhardt and N. Patel, Malawi’s process of democratic transition: An analysis of political 
developments between 1990 and 2003 (Lilongwe, Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation, 2004). 
12 R. Jenkins and M. Tsoka, ‘Malawi’, Development Policy Review, 21, 2 (2003), pp. 197-215. 
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stakeholders participating in both their formulation and implementation13.  This 
represented a significant normative shift from traditional hierarchical political 
relations.  Drawing on the process’ participatory claims in Malawi, members of the 
country’s Jubilee campaign for debt cancellation lobbied for involvement in the PRS 
formulation phase.  With initial funding from Oxfam, a loose network, of, initially, 
twenty-seven Malawian NGOs, religious groups, academics, trade unions and 
community groups known as the Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN), was 
formed.  Its express intention was to open up the political space provided by the PRS, 
affording a voice to the most marginalised, thereby challenging traditional elite 
relations.  This was a time of heady optimism as the new era of democratisation was 
seen to herald real changes to political culture and practice.  As one of the original 
members of the network observed…  
 
…there was an air of excitement in Malawi that we have changed from Dr 
Banda into this new government.  And even the government really had 
people’s trust.  We really thought things were going happen.  We didn’t expect 
[that] things were going to change in the next two or three years the way they 
have degenerated.  We had thought now we are on the right track.  So civil 
society opened up, there was no sense of fear, we thought we can be free to do 
everything.   
        (MEJN member) 
 
 
However, as we will see, the network has travelled a long and rocky road since that 
time as its leaders have attempted to mediate relations within and outside of the 
dominant hegemonic terrain that is encompassed in Malawi’s PRS process.  Before 
tracking this journey however, let us first examine in finer detail the political culture 
onto which this process was grafted.   
                                                 
13 World Bank, PRSP Sourcebook (Washington, World Bank Publications, 2000). 
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History, Culture and Context: The Challenges and Contradictions of 
Participatory Governance in Malawi 
 
The diversity of 53 countries across the continent notwithstanding, accounts of post-
colonial politics in Africa converge in highlighting the neo-patrimonial nature of the 
post-colonial state, with legitimacy and support for political leaders afforded through 
a combination of ‘big man’ rule14 and a complex network of clientelist relations15.  
The continuities of these cultures and practices with those of the colonial period have 
been explored in fine detail through the writings of Mahmood Mamdani and Jean-
François Bayart16, among others.  Bayart’s‘politique du ventre’ sees political leaders 
making subjects of their citizens in a manner reproducing colonial forms of authority, 
in the process generating cultures of dependency wherein political expression is 
mediated by the ‘patron’, broker or ‘big man’ upon whom the clients’ access to 
resources and means for daily survival rests.   
 
These more general characteristics are echoed in analysis and commentary on political 
culture in Malawi also.  In particular, a strongly hierarchical structure of social 
relations incorporating clientelist mechanisms of legitimacy and exchange, coupled 
                                                 
14 N. Chazan, R. Mortimer, J. Ravenhill and D. Rothchild, Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa 
(Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999); C. Young, ‘The African Colonial State and its Political Legacy’, in D. 
Rothchild and N. Chazan (eds.), The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa (Boulder: 
Westview, 1988), pp. 25 – 66. 
15 C. Allen, ‘Understanding African Politics’, Review of African Political Economy, 22, 65 (1995), pp. 
301-320; C. Clapham, ‘Discerning the New Africa’, International Affairs, 74, 2 (1998), pp.263-69; C. 
Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1999); J. Hubst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and 
Control (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000); N. van de Walle, African Economies and the 
Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999 (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
16 J. F. Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (Longman, London, 1993); M. Mamdani, 
Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (London, James Currey, 
1996). 
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with a strong authoritarian strain has been identified17 whereby patronage is bestowed 
on political representatives - ‘big men’ at all levels (MPs, councillors, Traditional 
Authorities (TAs), civic leaders) mediating between citizens and the administrative 
apparatus of the state18.  In many cases, what in the new democratic dispensation are 
regarded as citizen rights, are accorded through the mediation of a broker.  Examples 
include the siting of bore holes, road improvements, access to grain reserves or the 
attainment of certain employment positions.  Such clientelist relations are described as 
constituting not just a feature of political culture, but of society more broadly19.   
 
Taking this more historical and contextualised view, it would appear that the main 
features of Malawian political culture  lie somewhat at odds with the normative ethos 
of participatory governance.  In particular, the hierarchical, authoritative nature of 
society characterised by asymmetric power relations coupled with ongoing practices 
of clientelism, appear to leave leaders and citizens alike ill-prepared for engagement 
                                                 
17 L.B. Dzimbiri, ‘Democratic Politics and Chameleon-like Leaders’ in K.M. Phiri and K.R. Ross 
(eds.), Democratisation in Malawi: A Stocktaking (Blantyre, CLAIM, 1998); K.M. Phiri, ‘Reflections 
on Party Ideologies and Programmes’ in M. Ott, K.M. Phiri and N. Patel (eds.) Malawi’s Second 
Democratic Elections: Success, Problems and Prospects (Zomba, Kachere Press, 2000); S.J.S. 
Nkhoma, ‘Traditional and Elected Representatives in Decentralisation’ in B. Immink, S. Lembani, M. 
Ott and C. Peters-Berries (eds.) From Freedom to Empowerment: Ten Years of Democratisation in 
Malawi (Lilongwe, Forum for Dialogue and Peace, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Malawi-German 
Programme for Democracy and Decentralisation, National Initiative for Civic Education, 2003); J. 
Lwanda, ‘Changes in Malawi’s Political Landscape between 1999 and 2004: Nkhope ya Agalatia’ in 
M. Ott, B. Immink, B. Mhango and C. Peters-Berries (eds.) The Power of the Vote: Malawi’s 2004 
Parliamentary and Presidential Elections (Bakala, Montford Media, 2005). 
18 For a detailed account of neo-patrimonial politics and the role of achikulire (patrons or ‘big men’) in 
Malawi as a methodical and systemic practice arising from postcolonial anomolies (as opposed to 
Chabal and Daloz’s politics of disorder and chaos – P. Chabal and J-P. Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder 
as Political Instrument (London, James Currey, 1999)), see Lwanda, ‘Kwacha: The Violence of Money 
in Malawi’s Politics, 1954-2004. 
19 H. Englund, ‘Introduction: The Culture of Chameleon Politics’ in H. Englund (ed.) A Democracy of 
Chameleons: Politics and Culture in the New Malawi, (Blantyre, CLAIM, 2002); H. Englund, H. ‘Does 
Civic Education Disempower?’ in Immink et al,  From Freedom to Empowerment: Ten Years of 
Democratisation in Malawi; N. Patel, ‘Troublemakers and Bridge Builders: Conflict Management and 
Conflict Resolution’ in Ott, et al, The Power of the Vote: Malawi’s 2004 Parliamentary and 
Presidential Elections; D. Booth, D. Cammack, J. Harrigan, E. Kanyongolo, M. Mataure and N. 
Ngwire, ‘Drivers of Change and Development in Malawi’, ODI Working Paper 261 (UK, ODI, 2006).  
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in participatory processes which implicitly (and somewhat naively) presume the ready 
adoption of a power-sharing ethos by all involved.  However, it is important to note 
that political cultures are neither static nor immutable and there are some signs, as 
Malawi’s traditional legacies of authoritarianism weaken somewhat, of shifting 
relations between clients and brokers at all levels.   
 
While evolving trends within political cultures are difficult to analyse, evidence from 
both attitudinal surveys (Afrobarometer data as analysed by Khaila and Chibwana20) 
and popular discourse, as recorded in the national and local media, suggest that, 
although adherence to liberal values remains strong, trust in political leaders has fallen 
significantly21. With the mass media increasing its role as ‘the decisive space of 
politics’22, the motivations and behaviour of political leaders have come under greater 
scrutiny in recent years.  In the post-democratisation era, the media in Malawi, in 
particular the liberalised press23, and increasingly radio24 which is popular in rural 
areas, enjoys relative freedom and political life dominates public discourse.  While 
political reporting during the early years of press freedom was characterised by ‘mud-
slinging, muck-raking, character assassination’25, more in-depth investigative 
                                                 
20 S. Khaila and C. Chibwana, ‘Ten years of democracy: Are Malawians getting what they voted for?’, 
Afrobarometer Working Paper No 46, (Afrobarometer, February 2005). 
21 idem, pp. 20-24. 
22 M. Carnoy and M. Castells ‘Globalisation, the knowledge society, and the Network State: Poulantzas 
at the millennium’ Global Networks, 1, 1 (2001), pp. 1-18; see also M. Castells, The Rise of the 
Network Society, 2nd ed., (Oxford, Blackwell, 2000); J.G. Blumer and M. Gurevitch, ‘Rethinking the 
Study of Political Communication’ in J. Curran and M. Gurevitch (eds.) Mass Media and Society, 4th 
ed., (London, Hodder Arnold, 2005). 
23 S. Chimombo and M. Chimombo, The Culture of Democracy: Language, Literature, the Arts and 
Politics in Malawi, 1992-1994 (Zomba, WASI Publications, 1996); E.N. Chipangula, Political 
Reporting Trends in Malawi, (Makwasa, Malamulo Publishing, 2003). 
24 T. Neale, ‘Malawi’s Media – 2004 and Beyond’ in Ott et al, The Power of the Vote: Malawi’s 2004 
Parliamentary and Presidential Elections. 
25 Chimombo and Chimombo, The Culture of Democracy: Language, Literature, the Arts and Politics 
in Malawi, 1992-199, p. 32. 
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journalism is reported to be on the increase26.    The media’s exposure of abuses of 
public office may be argued to have had two consequences for political culture.  First, 
as evidenced in both popular discourse and falling voter turnout27, it has resulted in 
increasing public disillusionment with, and apathy towards, political institutions and 
their elites.  Newspaper articles with headlines such as Why our leaders fail28; The 
State of Malawi29; Political leaders need to consider cost of impasse30; and Never 
trust politicians31, to cite a few, exemplify the widespread disillusionment and distrust 
of political leaders.  An excerpt from the latter article provides a flavour of public 
perceptions of politics in contemporary Malawi. 
 
But then politics in Malawi is always seen as an all-important opening to 
social cachet and wealth… Avarice, jealousy, distrust and hate soon give birth 
to uncontrollable political maelstroms and fierce fighting erupts.  More 
struggles, more defections, more noise and more change.  And to bank my 
trust on people with inflated egos and bloated self-interest, politicians who 
can’t make up their minds on one thing and stick to it?  No thanks.32 
  
In an era where much politics is played out in the media, citizens are acutely aware of 
the motivations and interests of their political leaders.  This is aptly encapsulated in 
the astute observation of a Malawian peasant to John Lwanda33 who noted that 
‘Politicians cannot buy my brain, just my hungry stomach (referring to ex-President 
Muluzi’s practice of campaigning with hand-outs) but in your case (Lwanda being 
perceived as a wealthy Malawian elite) they buy both your stomach and your brain.’  
                                                 
26 Chipangula, Political Reporting Trends in Malawi. 
27 see B. Dulani. ‘The Elections under Scrutiny: Process – Results – Lessons’, in Ott et al, The Power 
of the Vote: Malawi’s 2004 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections. 
28 The Sunday Times, October 9th, 2005. 
29 Opinion, Kamkwamba Kalea, The Nation, October 10th, 2005. 
30 Editorial, The Nation, October 5th, 2005. 
31 Levi Kabwato, The Sunday Times, September 25th, 2005. 
32 idem. 
33 J. Lwanda, ‘Changes in Malawi’s Political Landscape between 1999 and 2004: Nkhope ya Agalatia’ 
in Ott et al, The Power of the Vote: Malawi’s 2004 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections, p. 56. 
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It would appear that traditional loyalties and deference to authority, among ‘ordinary 
people’ at least, may be weakening, as ‘clients’’ political astuteness challenges both 
the legitimacy and the hegemony of their erstewhile brokers.   
 
The key issue of interest here is how, and to what degree these ever-changing legacies 
impact upon actors’ agency within the new era of participatory governance.  It is to 
this question that we now turn. 
 
 
Between Citizenship and Clientship: Culture, politics and 
participation in Malawi 
 
The MEJN network initially came into being through its engagement in the PRS 
process.  Within its literature, MEJN consistently describes itself as a ‘bridge’ 
between civil society and the state34.  As the following section will show, this ‘bridge’ 
function initially saw leaders operating as brokers, securing participation for a wide 
range of the network’s member organisations in the PRS formulation process.  While 
on the one hand, with member organisations interested in using the opportunity to 
make contacts with donors in the hopes of securing funding for further activities, 
MEJN’s relations may be characterised as clientelist, with MEJN playing a ‘big man’ 
role in a triadic relationship between member organisations (clients) and potential 
funders, on the other, MEJN’s actions also succeeded in opening up the political 
space, potentially enhancing citizenship through the process.  As the following section 
will also show, donor interest in and support for MEJN resulted in its role as broker 
                                                 
34 MEJN, MEJN Programme Support Document (Malawi, MEJN, 2004), p.1; MEJN, The Malawi 
Economic Justice Network Profile (Malawi, MEJN, 2005), p.1. 
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declining over time.  Clientelist relations work both ways however – brokers and ‘big 
men’ need their clients as much as clients need their brokers – and the increasing 
marginalisation of its members fuelled questions of legitimacy and representation vis-
à-vis the network’s leadership.  The political space was opened once again as MEJN 
leaders set about securing representation in each district throughout the country.  As 
we will see, this move brought its own conflicts, with contradictory views as to their 
role and function emerging between MEJN’s leadership – negotiating the demands of 
donors – and its new client base, its district-level members themselves.  With MEJN’s 
new ‘clients’ appropriating both the spirit and the language of good governance to 
demand greater accountability and responsiveness from MEJN’s national level 
leadership to their own efforts to broker solutions to the everyday challenges of their 
local communities, the reality of ‘everyday politics’ as a composite of old and new 
becomes apparent.  This ‘everyday politics’ – a hybridised political complex sitting 
between citizenship and clientship – reveals a dynamism and vibrancy to 
contemporary political life in Malawi, with the political space remaining open and 
contested, and the actions of political actors at all levels under constant scrutiny and 
challenge.   
 
MEJN as broker? 
Upon hearing of plans for an upcoming PRS process, a meeting was organised by 
activists in the country’s Jubilee campaign to discuss their involvement in the PRS.  
At this meeting, which was held in Mangochi, it was decided to form a loose network, 
thereafter known as MEJN, and a core group within this network was selected to 
lobby for inclusion in the process.  As one of the participants in the meeting outlines 
below, this core group became the effective broker, selecting participants for inclusion 
in each of the processes’ thematic working groups (TWGs). 
 16 
  
What the team that was put in place in Mangochi, what they did was to go to 
government, get documents from them, get information from them, and 
circulate it to the other members.  And when the meetings, the TWGs 
happened, what used to happen was the government would invite us through 
that core team, and this core team is the one which would send invitations to 
whoever is supposed to attend that meeting.     
(MEJN member) 
 
Through its lobbying, this core group gained places for network members in 
seventeen of the process’s twenty-one thematic working groups.  Moreover, invoking 
the discourse of ‘participation’ underpinning the process and arguing that the three-
month timeframe left insufficient time to consult with member groups and their 
constituents, the core group also succeeded in extending the overall timeframe for the 
formulation process to nine months in total.   
 
The emphasis at this time within the core group was very much on opening up the 
political space, providing a voice to different groups and interests representing the 
poor and marginalised.  An implicit assumption often imbuing newly imported 
participatory processes is that the principal interest of civic participants is policy 
influence, representing ‘the poor’ and their interests.  However, when asked in 
interview as to their motivations in becoming involved, many participants noted that 
the process afforded them access to a range of major donors and hopefully thus 
further funding.   Elements of the old and new were thus apparent from the outset as 
MEJN core group leaders brokered potential clientelist relations between the 
networks’ members and state and donor actors35, while at the same time, succeeding 
                                                 
35 These developments bear similarities to the ‘elite solidarity’ relations observed by Sumich among 
political actors in Maputo in the early 2000s.  Sumich argues that Mozambique’s period of democratic 
transition promoted a hardening of elite class structures rather than a strengthening of vertical 
clientelist structures as argued by others.   In the Malawian case however, as we will see, this solidarity 
was short-lived.  See J. Sumich. ‘Politics after the Time of Hunger in Mozambique: A Critique of Neo-
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in opening up the political space and enhancing the democratic potential of the 
process.   
 
MEJN as client? 
MEJN’s engagement in the nine-month formulation process, and the relations fostered 
over that time were certainly felt by network members to have brought them to the 
attention of donors and state actors alike.  With a technocratic policy discourse 
dominating the process, the technical proficiency of select actors within particular 
working groups was highlighted as key in this regard.  As the network’s Director, 
reflecting back on the process some five years later notes… 
I think the caliber of people we featured in the TWGs [thematic working groups] 
but also in the drafting, the technical drafting team of the PRSP, was caliber that 
wouldn’t be doubted, by the government, the donors, and everybody else. 
       (MEJN Director) 
 
Following completion of the formulation of the PRS in 2001, MEJN decided that its 
focus should move to monitoring the strategy’s implementation.  This move 
corresponded to donor interest in monitoring the use of public (and their own) funds, 
countering corruption, and supporting the ‘good governance’ agenda which, in the 
post-Cold war era, had become synonymous with democratisation.  With MEJN 
moving into a new area of work which dovetailed neatly with donor agendas, funding 
began to pour in.  As the years evolved, MEJN successfully secured funds and carried 
out programs in a wide range of areas including budget training for NGOs and 
government officials, budget monitoring, and research (on trade, service delivery and 
maize distribution).  Its public profile grew significantly and network leaders made 
regular appearances in the press and on the airwaves.  By late 2006, MEJN was 
                                                                                                                                            
Patrimonial Interpretation of African Elites’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 34, 1 (2008), pp. 
111-25. 
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receiving support from over ten international donors, the majority of whom were 
funding specific programs of their own choosing.  And so, it appears that MEJN had 
moved significantly from its original mandate of colonising the country’s political 
space, and brokering broad-based participation in the PRS and its allied political 
processes, to what, reflecting the widespread popularity of the globalised ‘good 
governance’ discourse, was now ubiquitously referred to as its ‘watchdog role’.  In 
this, MEJN’s trajectory had seen it move from a broad-based activist network 
challenging elite relations to what could be described as a donor ‘client’ or contractee, 
carrying out specific programmes aimed at monitoring the use of donor funds and 
bolstering donor programmes36.   
 
As might be anticipated, these developments were not without their challenges.  Most 
significantly, they necessitated a growing professionalism and specialisation which 
network leaders felt was lacking among its members.  As the network’s Director 
notes. 
 
But this shift has brought with it a number of challenges.  Because the 
expectation in the membership of MEJN has been that they would be involved 
in the actual implementation of economic governance activities or programs 
that MEJN has on the ground.   
(MEJN Director) 
 
However, with MEJN’s leadership feeling network members were not ‘qualified’ 
enough to engage in these new activities, new more specialised staff were recruited to 
                                                 
36 The characterisation of MEJN as a donor ‘client’ is somewhat problematic in that MEJN was not 
providing political support to its patrons in the manner of clientelist relations as traditionally conceived.  
Indeed, donor relations with MEJN, which effectively amounted to a contracting of the network’s 
human resources and relations for monitoring donor investments (as argued by Gould (in The New 
Conditionality) in relation to PRS processes elsewhere) possibly bears more in common with the 
indirect rule of the British colonial era than traditional ‘patron-client’ relations. 
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do so.  And so, MEJN leaders transformed the network into an organisation in its own 
right, with an increasingly professionalised staff capable of carrying out the donor-
sponsored programmes which were now the life-blood of the organisation.  Relevant 
experience and academic qualifications were now required to be involved. 
I think one positive thing that has seen MEJN moving much more 
tremendously than the other organisations is our pragmatic approach in terms 
of staffing, because we say the minimum is we are going to recruit somebody 
who has got say a Bachelors degree, or indeed whose experience is closer to 
having a Bachelors degree.       
       (MEJN Director) 
 
With MEJN leaders increasing the size of the secretariat and increasingly taking on 
much of the work themselves, conflict was inevitable.  Network members, feeling 
excluded and sidelined, accused MEJN leaders of turning the network into an NGO.  
In the words of one member. 
 
MEJN is a network.  They should not be implementers.  Let them use their 
members…  Of course there have been some clashes between MEJN and their 
members… And people have moved away from getting interested in MEJN.  
Because MEJN wants to be the implementer.  … I think that’s a conflict, that’s 
where the conflict comes in now.   
(Representative of MEJN member organization) 
 
 
This acrimony demonstrates the conflict between member organisations’ own 
expectations of MEJN as a broker and donors’ demands on MEJN as a client.  While 
member organisations anticipated that MEJN leaders would broker ongoing work 
arising out of the formulation process for them (as ‘implementers’), the technical 
demands of such work left MEJN leaders sourcing expertise elsewhere and carrying 
out this work themselves.   
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MEJN at this point certainly appears guilty of many of the charges fuelled more 
widely against Southern NGOs by the end of 1990s, whereby NGOs were accused of 
uncritically swallowing the agendas of donors and turning development ‘into just 
another “business”’37.  Its impetus at the time of its establishment – that of bringing a 
wider set of voices to the PRS table thereby potentially enhancing citizenship – had 
become over-ridden by the agendas of funding agencies – the professional 
requirements of which led to a widening gap between the network’s leadership, its 
membership (clients), and the people it was purporting to represent.  However 
MEJN’s story does not end here as, in actions demonstrating a demand for ongoing 
accountability and legitimacy within Malawian political society, MEJN’s leaders were 
forced to once again open up the democratic space.   
 
With the growing gap between its members (clients) and the leadership (brokers) 
occurring at a time when MEJN was gaining both national and international renown, 
the network’s leadership began to lose the support of its members as its legitimacy 
and accountability as a political civic actor became increasingly brought into question.  
Although marketing itself as the ‘bridge’ between society and state, as well as a 
specialist in ‘participatory economic governance’38, the network’s leadership was 
faced with a growing public consciousness that it had not consolidated a grassroots 
base which might feed into policy and advocacy activities.  Indeed, with policy and 
programs in the country becoming more and more decentralised following the Local 
                                                 
37 J. Pearce, ‘Development, NGOs and civil society: the debate and its future’ in D. Eade (ed.) 
Development, NGOs and Civil Society (Oxford, Development in Practice Reader, 2000), p. 4; see also 
D. Hulme and M. Edwards, ‘NGOs, States and Donors: An Overview’ in NGOs, States and Donors – 
Too Close for Comfort? (New York, Save the Children Fund, 1997); D. Lewis and P. Opoku-Mensah, 
‘Moving forward Research Agendas on International NGOs: Theory, Agency and Context’, Journal of 
International Development, 18  (2006), pp. 665-75. 
38 MEJN, MEJN Programme Support Document (Malawi, MEJN, 2004), p.1; MEJN, The Malawi 
Economic Justice Network Profile (Malawi, MEJN, 2005), p.1. 
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Government Reform Act, the MEJN network appeared the very embodiment of the 
‘elite’ NGO divorced from its roots as depicted in the critical development literature 
of the late 1990s.   The network remained largely urban-based, purporting to represent 
the poor, yet with an office and entire staff in Lilongwe.  In 2002, cognisant of these 
issues and attempting to respond to public critiques, MEJN’s leadership began to 
build a local network of representation in the form of what became known as the 
District Chapter Program.   
 
 
MEJN District Chapters: Clients or brokers? 
MEJN’s District Chapter Program consists of locally elected voluntary committees of 
eight to ten people who aim to represent the interests of their communities at district 
level.  Committees have been established in twenty-seven of Malawi’s twenty-nine 
districts.  Each district has its own local government in line with the country’s 
decentralization policy.  Chapter committees consist principally of representatives of 
both local NGOs and local community-based associations including youth groups, 
women’s groups, faith-based groups, and trade and business associations.  Although 
MEJN leaders now appeared to have established a locally-based membership 
structure, fundamental contradictions soon emerged between the leadership’s view of 
the Chapter’s role and Chapter committee members’ own views.  MEJN’s leaders’ 
aim in developing the local structures was to put in place structures to assist in 
carrying out donor programmes, with committee members engaging in monitoring 
local budgets and systematically gathering data and information in specified areas 
(food security, health, education etc.) and feeding this upwards to leaders for what 
MEJN, reflecting the dominant donor policy discourse, terms its ‘evidence based 
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advocacy’39.  In essence, these new structures were to become MEJN leaders’ new 
client base.  Significantly however, Chapter members had very different visions of 
their role.  These principally involved acting as ‘bridges’ or brokers themselves 
between district authorities and local populations, negotiating and brokering everyday 
resources and services for their communities (itself a problematic concepts and 
generally mediated or ‘brokered’ through a Traditional Authority or village chief).  
Committee members from a number of different Chapters explain the everyday 
problems facing people in their areas and the role they see themselves playing in this 
regard. 
People are complaining about roads, people are complaining about drugs, 
that they are not receiving enough drugs in the hospitals… issues of fertiliser 
subsidies.  People do not have money to buy fertiliser.  What are you supposed 
to do? 
       Karonga Chapter member 
 
I give you a case where the road – this MASAF programme40 – the one who 
was given the contract was getting at least some money in conjunction with 
the chief [Traditional Authority].  And people were so concerned to say ‘why 
the road is not finished and the money is gone.  And you people are doing the 
work’.  So they came to complain here.  So I went to consult somebody at the 
District Commissioners office, I said ‘this is happening, can you do please do 
something?  I want you to rectify this problem’.  So at least everybody was 
paid and that road is finished by now.   
      Mchinji Chapter member 
 
One time the pump closed.  And we went to the DC [District Commissioner] 
ourselves, at night even, around nine o clock.  We went to the DC and said 
‘what’s happening’?  And the DC then knew and saw that it was opened 
again. 
                                                 
39 MEJN, MEJN Programme Support Document (Malawi, MEJN, 2004), p.2. 
 
40 The Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) – is a World Bank funded safety net programme which 
has been in place since 1995.  The third phase of the programme (MASAF 3) commenced in 2008.  
There have been widespread allegations of abuse and political manipulation of funds.  For more on the 
programme itself see www.masaf.org.  For a more critical view of the programme by a Malawian 
academic see P. Kishindo, ‘Community Project Funding in Malawi under the Malawi Social Action 
Fund (MASAF) Demand-Driven Approach: Potential for Perpetuating Imbalances in Development’, 
Journal of Social Development in Africa, 15, 1 (2000), pp. 5-14. 
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      Chitipa Chapter member 
 
Chapter members have introduced themselves and have become known to local 
District authorities – both Assembly structures and MPs.  In this way, they provide an 
outlet for people to voice their concerns and problems and it appears they have been 
somewhat successful in gaining some small, yet important, benefits for local people.   
 
While Chapters’ roles might seem superfluous given the remit of local authorities in 
meeting local needs, in a context where significant gaps exist between authorities and 
local people and where the language of rights and entitlements remains a relatively 
recent import, this brokerage function fills an important gap.  Moreover, while, as we 
have seen, there are signs that political culture is changing and authoritarianism 
weakening somewhat, it is important not to overstate these shifts.  Memories of the 
past are ever present41, as a member of the Chitipa Chapter articulates. 
 
Fear is still there.  And you know, Malawi, of course we have been under 
dictatorship for 31 years.  And the principle was ‘lie low and live low, lift up 
your head and it will be choked’.  So with that kind of principle of living, 
people are still afraid to say anything against the government, anything 
against the politicians. 
      Chitipa Chapter member 
 
 
While the Chapters’ brokering of people’s concerns and demands echo more 
traditional clientelist relations, where many members note that the status acquired 
locally by virtue of being associated with MEJN is important, it is also important to 
note that they offer a space for citizens to speak and voice real concerns. When asked 
                                                 
41 Jack Mapanje, a well-known Malawian poet, himself jailed for a number of months during the 
Banda era, provides a vivid account of the violence and repression of the time – see J. Mapanje,‘The 
orality of dictatorship: In defence of my country’ in Englund, A Democracy of Chameleons: Politics 
and Culture in the New Malawi.  See also Africa Watch, Where Silence Rules: The Suppression of 
Dissent in Malawi (London, Africa Watch, 1990). 
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why they voluntarily give their time to work in this manner, many Chapter members 
noted the importance for people to have an outlet to speak and be heard.  As one 
member of Ntcheu Chapter noted, ‘Myself, I am satisfied when I see that people can 
talk now’.  The new layer of clientelism created through MEJN’s District Chapters 
clearly carries significant potential for enhanced citizenship and political voice at 
local level also, once more demonstrating a porosity between old and new cultures 
and practices.  
 
Of course, the lines between Chapters as brokers for local communities and as clients 
of MEJN leaders are similarly blurred.  With MEJN’s success in attracting donor 
funds well-known as its public profile has grown (in no small part due to its own 
intensive media profiling), Chapter members also harbour expectations that some of 
this funding will filter through to them.  All eight Chapters interviewed spoke about 
the real constraints imposed by the lack of resources.  At the times of interview 
(2005), although plans had been in place for almost a year to provide a modest 
monthly allowance for phones and transport, this had not yet materialised.  All 
Chapters were paying their own expenses – including transport to outlying villages 
and farms, and members of Nsanje’s Chapter had even rented a room themselves at 
3000 Kwacha per month for people to know where to access them.  Their real 
financial constraints notwithstanding, Chapter members’ clientelist support is not 
easily bought as they remain emphatic that their role remains that of brokers for their 
local communities.  A member of the Nsanje Chapter articulates this clearly, ‘We are 
not here for the secretariat [MEJN’s leadership], we are here for the community.  And 
what we need is for the secretariat to help us with certain issues.  If they are failing to 
help us, it means that this is not working as things should be…’ , while a member 
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from Ntcheu is emphatic that more efforts (and consequently resources for transport) 
are required to access people in outlying rural areas and villages,  ‘MEJN is for the 
people… If MEJN is only for the boma [district main town] then we are a failure.  It’s 
the people in the grassroots who need MEJN more’.   
   
Conclusion 
The politics of patronage and the cultures and practices of clientelism it engenders 
tend to evoke one of two reactions from commentators.  There are those who, 
focusing on the formal institutions of governance, blame it for many (if not all) of 
Africa’s ills, and there are those who close their eyes and choose to ignore its 
existence altogether.  Yet the reality is that these cultures, though not immutable or 
unchanging, nonetheless persist.  The wholescale importation and superimposition of 
new models and cultures, no matter how well intended, will not readily or speedily 
lead to their demise.  The challenge therefore becomes one of engagement with the 
contemporary politics of everyday life – both in the formal arenas but also at the less 
visible micro-sites of struggle and contestation.  In an attempt to understand the 
dynamics of contemporary political life, our attention needs to turn to how old and 
new interact, and what new variants emerge. 
 
In the Malawian case, this paper has uncovered a particular hybridised variant 
hovering somewhere between clientship and citizenship.  And, contrary to the more 
negative overtones of much of the political science literature, the news is not all bad.  
While the brokers and the clients animating this variant may be characterised as 
traditional actors operating within and reinforcing traditional hierarchical, asymmetric 
cultures, the ongoing accountability and responsiveness required by clients of brokers 
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arguably represents a more open, democratic and accountable form of governance 
than that provided by five or seven-yearly ballot box contests42.  MEJN’s experiences 
have amply shown Malawi’s hybridised variant to possess its own inbuilt checks and 
balances where accountability and legitimacy remains an ongoing challenge to actors 
at all levels.  Moreover the brokerage element of Malawi’s political culture and 
practice, when combined with new discourses on participation and representation has, 
at times, proven very effective in opening up political spaces and affording a voice 
(albeit still mediated through brokers at present) to many of the heretofore voiceless.   
 
What lessons does MEJN’s experience in Malawi bring?  First, for those interested in 
or engaged in transformative social change, it shows the ongoing importance of ‘the 
politics of the everyday’.  Challenging us to move beyond our more traditional 
conceptual boundaries, MEJN’s story uncovers a hybridised political complex which 
may, in fact, represent a more dynamic and active form of citizenship than its 
normalised, and often idealised, Western variant.  And second, MEJN’s experience 
shows the inherent dangers of donors choosing to ignore the political context in which 
they operate.  In Malawi, donor exigencies in respect of MEJN’s agency threatened to 
close down the political space opened up by MEJN (and its supporters’ / clients’) 
actions.  Moreover, it was clients’ own challenges to MEJN’s legitimacy (and not 
donor actions) which led to a re-opening of this space. 
 
                                                 
42 Similar findings have been found and a similar argument has also been made with respect to ongoing 
popular demands for accountability from elected leaders in Botswana.  See both J. L. Comaroff and J. 
Comaroff, ‘Postcolonial Politics and Discourses of Democracy in Southern Africa: An Anthropological 
Reflection on African Political Modernities’, Journal of Anthropological Research, 53, 2 (Summer, 
1997), pp. 123-46; and D. Durham, ‘Uncertain Citizens: Herero and the New Intercalary Subject in 
Botswana, in R. Werbner (ed.), Postcolonial Subjectivities in Africa, (London and New York, Zed 
Books, 2002), pp. 139-70 
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The specific case of MEJN provides a doorway into the multiple sites of political 
struggle and contestation in Malawi.  Does it teach us anything about politics further 
afield?  Clearly, Malawi’s history and development is unique and its realities do not 
pertain everywhere.  However, elements of the political legacies and culture found 
here – the ‘big man’ politics, clientelism, authoritarianism, and loyalty – are to be 
found elsewhere in Africa, and indeed more widely43.  This makes Malawi’s situation, 
with its complex dialectics of old and new, one from which we, commentators, 
practitioners and donors alike, might draw broader lessons on how citizenship and 
clientship combine in shaping unique, yet constantly changing, models of political 
agency in contemporary African democracies.   
 
 
 
                                                 
43 Robins, Cornwall and von Lieres, ‘Rethinking “Citizenship” in the Postcolony’; For a detailed 
account of the culture and ongoing practice of clientelism in Ireland, see also N. Gaynor, Transforming 
Participation: The Politics of Development in Malawi and Ireland (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010). 
 
